HOUSING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES:
A "LEGISLATIVE" HISTORY
OF Mount Laurel II
John M. Payne*
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel (Mount Laurel II)1 is as much a problem in judicial process as
it is a problem of zoning and housing law. Whether the decision and
its progeny ever help solve, or even mitgate, the land use problems
concerning the court, the method by which the New Jersey Supreme
Court informed itself and decided these issues will be of continuing
interest to students of law and politics.
Another article in this symposium issue will explore at length the
proposition that Mount Laurel II encroaches, properly or improperly,
on the prerogatives of the political branches of the government of New
Jersey. 2 While this normative question is an interesting and difficult
one, the thrust of my concern here is primarily descriptive. I seek to
record the process by which Mount Laurel II came to be decided, and
to test some aspects of the resulting decision against that decisional
process. 3 By doing so, I hope both to illuminate the issues of housing
right and remedy referred to in my title, and to invite further inquiry
and debate about the process of judicial decisionmaking in matters
that have strong overtones of legislative policymaking.
The in camera deliberations of the supreme court in Mount
Laurel II are of course beyond our grasp and are likely to remain so.
Fortunately, a sound recording of the oral arguments, which took
place on October 20-22, 1980, and again on December 15, 1980, has
been preserved. Excerpts from these tapes form the principal basis of
4
this article.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey. The author
had no involvement in the Mount Laurel II litigation up to the time the opinion of the court was
announced, but since August 1983, he has been co-counsel for the plaintiffs in the remand of
Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of Carteret, one of the six cases decided
therein. The focus of this paper was chosen to avoid specific comments on issues germane to the
ongoing remand litigation, but the reader is invited to note and correct any implicit bias that
may have crept in.
92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel II].
2 See Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14 SETON
HALL L. REv. 851 (1984).
The Mount Laurel II decision is quite lengthy and a full survey of all of the interesting
aspects of judicial process involved in the decision is most certainly beyond the scope of this
article.
I A note about methodology is appropriate here. The quotations from the Mount Laurel II
arguments are based on transcripts prepared by the author from tapes supplied by the New
Jersey Supreme Court that are now in the collection of the Rutgers University Mount Laurel
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The article is divided as follows: Part I will briefly summarize the
state of the Mount Laurel doctrine as it had developed between March
1975 and early 1980, and will recapitulate issues presented by the six
cases consolidated for argument in Mount Laurel II. Part II will then
describe and comment upon the unique structure which the court
established for the presentation of the six cases. Readers familiar with
the actual course of the litigation will find little new here, but recordation of the litigation history seems nonetheless useful since it is only
partially recapitulated in the Mount Laurel II opinion. This is particularly so with respect to the matters described in Part II.
Parts III and IV will then analyze two areas of doctrinal interest
that flow from the subsequent opinion in Mount Laurel II, and examine how those areas were treated during the oral arguments in 1980.
Part III explores whether the case recognizes a constitutionally-protected right to shelter, while Part IV investigates the broad methodological choices made by the court to fashion a Mount Laurel remedy, including the roles of the State Development Guide Plan
(SDGP) 5, the 1978 Housing Allocation Report (HAR)6 , and the three
special judges designated to hear Mount Laurel cases.

Research Center. Because a complete transcript of the argument is not yet available, the extracts
will be cited to their approximate locations on each tape. The tapes are numbered consecutively,
with the sides designated A and B. Within each tape and side, location has been divided roughly
into tenths. Thus, a quotation beginning three-quarters of the way through the second side of the
eighth tape would be identified Tape 8(B).7.
It is uniformly possible to identify the attorney speaking at any given point, because this
follows the printed order of argument and also because the Justices themselves frequently address
the speaker by name. The Justices, however, are less readily identified, since their interruptions
do not follow any predetermined course. Because the resulting opinion was unanimous, it has
seemed less urgent to make precise identification of the Justices, and the term "THE COURT"
will ordinarily be used in order to avoid erroneous attribution of remarks.
It should also be noted that the transcript has been edited to eliminate the customary "ums"
and "errs" and false starts of spontaneous speech; where there was any doubt about context or
meaning, however, these blemishes have been left intact. The author intends no disrespect of any
speaker in these editorial decisions, but thought it preferable to let the reader draw his or her
own conclusions at points of difficulty rather than to risk making erroneous changes in substance.
Readers interested in obtaining a complete transcript of the oral argument when it is available,
for the cost of reproducing it, are invited to contact the author directly.
' The SDCP is a statewide planning document which divides the state into a variety of
developmental areas. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A.2d at 423-24. The SDGP is the
"only official determination of the state's plan for its own future development and growth." Id.,
456 A.2d at 424. The state is divided on a concept map into six basic developmental areas:
growth, limited growth, agriculture, conservation, pinelands, and coastal zones. Id. at 226, 456
A.2d at 424.
6 See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HAR.
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BETWEEN THE MOUNT LAURELS

A. The Mount Laurel I Trilogy
A trilogy of cases marked the New Jersey Supreme Court's handling of the exclusionary zoning problem prior to 1980. The first, of
course, was Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I) 7 which held that "developing municipalities ' 8 could not preclude the construction of low and moderate
income housing through exclusionary land use regulations.9
As befits a landmark case, Justice Frederick Hall's opinion in
Mount Laurel I was more concerned with explicating the constitutional and social precepts which required the court's action than in
giving detailed guidance to the lower courts on matters of implementation. 10 For instance, the court did not attempt to set forth either a
general definition of what constitutes a housing region, or a methodology of fair share determination. Thus, the principal accomplishment
of Mount Laurel I was to serve notice on the municipal law and
zoning bars that exclusionary zoning henceforth was illegal in New
Jersey, and that the catalogued regulatory practices in which Mount
Laurel Township and numerous other municipalities had engaged
constituted exclusionary zoning.
The more difficult task of implementation of the Mount Laurel
doctrine really began with the second case in the trilogy, Oakwood at
Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,I1decided two years later. The
supreme court's first accomplishment in Madison Township was a
7 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel I].
' The phrase "'developing municipalities" was first used by the Mount Laurel I court in
reference to those towns which shared Mount Laurel's open spaces and development potential.
Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 190, 336 A.2d at 733. In Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Township, 164
N.J. Super. 563, 397 A.2d 384 (Law Div. 1978), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Southern
Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983),
the trial court formulated a six-point test based on the supreme court's analysis:
A developing municipality (1) has a sizeable land area, (2) lies outside the central
cities and older built-up suburbs, (3) his substantially shed rural characteristics, (4)
has undergone great population increase since World War II or is now in the process
of doing so, (5) is not completely developed and (6) is in the path of inevitable future
residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth.
Id. at 567-68, 397 A.2d at 386.
1 Mt. Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725.
10 In fact, Justice Hall's explanation of the doctrine's remedial aspects was remarkably brief,
covering just a few paragraphs. Id. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734. The Justice noted that -[i]t is not
appropriate at this time, particularly in view of the advanced view of zoning law as applied to
housing laid down in this opinion, to deal with the matter of the further extent of judicial power
in the field or to exercise any, such power." Id. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734.
1 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
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negative, albeit necessary, one: In light of the intense criticism which
had greeted the Mount Laurel I decision, Madison Township became
in effect a rehearing, and the court was at pains to reaffirm in the
strongest possible terms its commitment to the legal and social premises of Mount Laurel I.
In turning to remedy, however, the Madison Township court
took a considerably weaker and more cautious course; one which, in
some views, belied its affirmation of Mount Laurel I and clearly
signaled that the doctrine was in trouble.12 Specifically, the court
declined to establish, or to require that the trial court establish, a
precise housing region or any numerical fair share quotas.13 Instead,
the trial court was instructed to take into consideration a variety of
factors in deciding whether the municipality had made "bona fide
efforts" to revise (post-litigation) its zoning ordinances to comply with
regional fair share needs.' 4 In effect, the supreme court committed
these questions to the discretion of all the trial judges of the state,
apparently hoping to avoid or to minimize future reversals on appeal.
The Madison Township court also approved of the concept of
"least cost" housing,' 5 recognizing that the unsubsidized housing market would be unable to provide new housing within the financial
grasp of the poorest segments of the population, regardless of the
availability of permissive zoning.' 6 At the same time, the court emphatically declined to read into the Mount Laurel I doctrine an affirmative obligation on the part of any municipality to seek out subsiSee, e.g., Rose, The Mount Laurel II Decision: Is It Based on Wishful Thinking?, 12 REAL
L.J. 115, 117 (1983) (describing Madison Township opinion as a tactical retreat from
Mount Laurel I opinion).
"3 Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 498-99, 371 A.2d at 1200.
11 Id. at 514-44, 371 A.2d at 1222-23.
'5 Id. at 512, 371 A.2d at 1207. The Madison Township court referred to "least cost" housing
as the lowest cost housing which can be constructed by private developers absent "publicly
assisted means or appropriately legislated incentives," and constructed "consistent with minimum standards of health and safety." Id. In Mount Laurel II the court defined "least cost"
housing as "the least expensive housing that builders can provide after removal by a municipality
of all excessive restrictions and exactions and after thorough use by a municipality of all
affirmative devices that might lower costs." Mt. Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451
(emphasis in original).
In utilizing and approving the "least cost" housing concept, the Madison Township court
recognized that lower income persons might not benefit directly from this device. Rather,
through the "filtering down" process, " 'families in the moderate income group [would] move
into [the] new [least cost] housing created . . . [thus] making available existing housing for lower
income families who cannot afford the new.' " Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 512, 371 A.2d at
1207 (quoting defendant-municipality's brief). The "filtering down" process, the court recognized, would thus serve to supplement the total supply of available housing and indirectly
provide better housing for low income persons. Id. at 513-14, 371 A.2d at 1208. For a discussion
of the Mount Laurel II court's treatment of the "least cost" and "filter down" theories, see Mt.
Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 278, 456 A.2d at 451-52; see also Rose, supra note 2, at 74-87.
16Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 512-14, 371 A.2d at 1207-08.
12
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dies or to take what would otherwise be discretionary steps to provide
public or publicly-assisted housing. 7 Finally, the court ordered that
the plaintiff, Oakwood at Madison, Inc., be granted what has become
known as a "builder's remedy."' 8 Oakwood, the court held, was
entitled to a permit to build its proposed housing immediately, without regard to the ultimate rezoning of Madison Township.' 9 This
precluded the municipality from retaliating against the plaintiff by
redrawing its zoning map in an otherwise constitutional manner, but
omitting Oakwood's site from the high density residential zone. The
to the plaintiff who had
"builder's remedy" was seen as a "reward"
20
interest.
public
the
in
suit
brought a
Pascack Association, Ltd. v. Mayor of Township of Washington, 2' and its companion case, Fobe Associates v. Mayor of Demarest,2 2 form the third branch of the Mount Laurel trilogy, Washington Township addressed a major loose end of the Mount Laurel I
case by deciding that an older, built-up suburb, not on the outer ring
of growth beyond the central cities, was not a "developing municipality" and therefore was not subject to the constitutional constraints of
the Mount Laurel doctrine. 2 3 Moreover, in Demarest, the court expanded the logic of Washington Township by concluding that a "fully
developed" municipality could not be compelled to grant a use variance for multi-family housing on "regional need" 24 grounds. The
court reasoned that the inconsistency, found as fact in the proceedings
below, between this unwanted type of housing and that of the community's established single-family character justified this exemption. 25
In Washington Township and in Demarest, the supreme court
again opted for caution, and in doing so significantly limited the scope
of the Mount Laurel doctrine, since much of the real pressure for
lower income housing probably exists closer to, rather than farther
from, the central cities-precisely in those older areas exempted by
17

Id. at 546-47, 371 A.2d at 1224-25.

11 Id. at 551, 371 A.2d at 1227. The builder's remedy is a form of relief which permits a
builder-plaintiff to proceed with his proposed development when a zoning ordinance is found
invalid. See Mt. Laurel 1, 92 N.J. at 279-81, 456 A.2d at 452-53; see also Rose, supra note 2, at
text accompanying notes 98-116. In Mount Laurel II the court imposed two preconditions on the
granting of a builder's remedy: (1) the builder-plaintiff must propose a project which will result
in construction of a substantial amount of lower income housing; and (2) the proposed project
must accord with sound land use planning. Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452.
Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 551, 371 A.2d at 1226-27.
20 Id. at 552-53, 371 A.2d at 1227-28.
21 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
22 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977).
213 Washington Township, 74 N.J. at 485-86, 379 A.2d at 13-14.
214 Essentially, "regional need" is the burden on a given area to provide for low and moderate
income housing. See Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 498, 371 A.2d at 1200.
"' See Demarest, 74 N.J. at 532-38, 379 A.2d at 38-41.
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Washington Township and Demarest. By deciding that the Mount
Laurel doctrine did not apply to redevelopment of older communities,
the court in effect ignored the possibility that such redevelopment, as
opposed to static maintenance of present housing types, might occur
in the future. Since both Washington Township and Demarest are
very small communities with virtually no undeveloped land areas, the
decisions involving these communities could have been distinguished
on these grounds. In the general mood of retreat which followed
Madison Township, however, it is not surprising that Washington
Township and Demarest were instead read broadly as confirmation
that the New Jersey Supreme Court had abandoned a major part of its
commitment to implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine.
This reading was compounded by the introduction in Washington Township of what proved to be a fateful procedural miscalculation, one which immediately encouraged foot-dragging in the lower
courts. Despite the emphasis in Mount Laurel I on the heavy burden
which defendant-municipalities would have to bear once their ordinance was shown to have exclusionary features,26 the Washington
Township decision appeared eager to defer to local prerogatives, citing with approval a pre-Mount Laurel decision in a nonexclusionary
case which iterated a conventional "arbitrary and capricious" standard for upsetting a local ordinance. 27 While a deferential standard
has much to commend itself generally, it was clearly inconsistent with
the aggressive pursuit of a reform doctrine such as Mount Laurel I; it
is not realistic to expect that trial judges and litigants will continue to
spend large amounts of time and money trying these cases, only to
face an uncertain future on review, or consistent reversal on deference
grounds. As will be noted, these concerns were soon realized in the
28
lower courts.
B. The Six Cases
The disarray induced by the New Jersey Supreme Court's indecisive handling of its trilogy of decisions is reflected in the six cases
which were consolidated on appeal in Mount Laurel 11.29 The lead
21 Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 729.

21 See Washington Township, 74 N.J. at 481, 379 A.2d at 11 (citing Bow & Arrow Manor,
Inc. v. West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 343, 307 A.2d 563, 567 (1973) (municipal zoning ordinances
accorded presumption of validity which can only be overcome by affirmative showing that
ordinance is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable)).
28 See infra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
29 92 N.J. at 158-59, 456 A.2d at 390-91. The six cases are: Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel; Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v.
Borough of Carteret; Caputo v. Township of Chester; Glenview Dev. Co. v. Franklin Town-
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case, of course, involved Mount Laurel Township itself. After the
remand in Mount Laurel I, the township had rezoned twenty acres
(out of 14,700 in the town) for a high density residential use, 30 but had
otherwise done nothing to encourage construction of low and moderate income housing. 3' The plaintiffs again went to court, joined eventually by a private developer who sought to build a mobile home
community in the township. 32 The trial court, however, felt bound by
the "bona fide effort" standard of Madison Township33 and on that
basis found Mount Laurel's modest effort sufficient. 34 The case went
up on appeal both to test this conclusion and to examine the methodology used by Mount Laurel in determining that it had a very small
35
"fair share" obligation.
Two other cases presented major issues. In Urban League of
Essex County v. Township of Mahwah,36 the trial court had found
that the Mount Laurel obligation was satisfied by rezoning to permit
construction of townhouses selling for over $70,000 per unit. 37 The
Township argued that this was the "least cost" housing that could be
built in the Mahwah area, relying on Madison Township for the "least
cost" doctrine. 38 In Glenview Development Co. v. Franklin Township,39 the trial court had found that there was no Mount Laurel
obligation at all, on the basis that Franklin was "rural" rather than
developing. 40 Franklin Township thus complemented, in a symmetrical fashion, the holdings of Washington Township and Demarest that
"developed" communities need not accept a Mount Laurel obliga4
tion. '
Both Mahwah and Franklin Township won at the trial level. In
two other cases, however, builder-plaintiffs were successful. Each of
these cases tested various aspects of the remedial powers of the trial

ship; Urban League of Essex County v. Township of Mahwah; and Round Valley, Inc. v.
Township of Clinton.

Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 297, 456 A.2d at 462.
31 See id. at 198-99 & 293-95, 456 A.2d at 409-11 & 459-60.
'2 Id. at 293-94, 456 A.2d at 459-60.
30

31 See supra text accompanying note 14.
11 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 304-05, 456 A.2d at 465.
11 See id. at 299-303, 456 A.2d at 463-64 for a discussion of the method used by the Township
in determining its fair share and the Mount Laurel II court's treatment of this issue.

3. 92 N.J. 158, 322, 456 A.2d 390, 480 (1983).
11 Id. at 333, 456 A.2d at 481.

38 Id.
3. 92 N.J. 158, 316, 456 A.2d 390, 471 (1983).
40 Id. at 318, 456 A.2d at 472.
4! See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Washington Township
and Demarest cases.
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court. Round Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clinton42 involved questions regarding the builder's remedy and the proper use of masters.
The "builder's remedy" had been approved in Madison Township but
43
with language that suggested it would be an extraordinary remedy.
Masters had been used extensively at the trial level in Washington
Township, but the supreme court's disposition of the case on appeal
had made it impossible to review this issue. Caputo v. Township of
Chester 44 also raised the builder's remedy question, as well as the
45
validity of "large lot zoning.In many ways, however, the most important of the six cases was
Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of Carteret
(Urban League).46 The trial judge there was David Furman, whose
thoughtful handling of the original Madison Township litigation 41 in
the early seventies had laid the foundation for the Mount Laurel
doctrine even though the Mount Laurel case eventually reached the
supreme court first. The only multi-defendant litigation among the six
cases, Urban League was a major effort to improve the efficiency of
proof in exclusionary zoning cases. Judge Furman had accepted the
county as a housing region, and he had approved a statistical methodology for allocating need that had the virtues of simplicity and clarity
48
rather than planning sophistication.
On both regional definition and allocation methodology, Judge
Furman's Urban League approach was arguably erroneous, particularly because it took place before the Madison Township court articulated the numberless fair share principle.4" Based on its reading of the
latter case, the appellate division reversed Judge Furman's holding.
Instead of giving the trial court and the plaintiffs another chance to
make their proofs, which would have been the sensible way to handle
the problems of still-emerging doctrine, it dismissed the action out-

92 N.J. 158, 321, 456 A.2d 390, 474 (1983).
See Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 551-52 n.50, 371 A.2d at 1227 n.50.
41 92 N.J. 158, 309, 456 A.2d 390, 468 (1983).
1 Id. at 310, 456 A.2d at 468.
46 92 N.J. 158, 339, 456 A.2d 390, 484 (1983).
11 Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223
(Law Div. 1974), af'd and modified, 72 N.J. 483, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
41 Judge Furman allocated the major portion of regional need equally among the 11 defendants remaining at the end of the trial, without regard to present population or amount of
available land. Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of Carteret, 142 N.J.
Super. 11, 37, 359 A.2d 526, 526 (Ch. 1976), rev'd, 170 N.J. Super. 461, 406 A.2d 1322 (App.
Div. 1979), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). This technique was eventually disapproved
by the supreme court in Mount Laurel II. See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 350, 456 A.2d at 489.
41 See supra text accompanying note 13.
42

13
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right, concluding that the plaintiffs had mischosen their theory and
therefore had "failed to prove" any regional housing need. 50 Since the
Urban League case included Madison Township, whose failure to
accommodate "regional need" had already been found by the same
trial judge and approved by the supreme court in Madison Township,
the unsympathetic tenor of the appellate division's viewpoint is readily understood. 51
The six cases, in short, revealed the full range of problems associated with implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine, problems
which the New Jersey Supreme Court had not only evaded in its
earlier opinions, but had probably exacerbated by seeming to lack the
will to face them. The problem was not limited to the courts, as the
next section notes.

C. The PoliticalResponse
A political response was not forthcoming, despite the court's
repeated calls for a political solution to the problem it had identified.
Mount Laurel I was decided in March 1975. That fall, the New Jersey
Legislature enacted a comprehensive revision of the state's zoning and
52
planning statutes known as the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL)
which became effective in 1976. Although the preamble and policy
sections of the new law provide verbal recognition of the regional
perspective in land use planning to a greater degree than did the old
law, the provisions for regional planning were left wholly voluntary as
before. Thus, the exclusionary zoning problem was effectively ignored
by the legislature, and the legislative history clearly shows that this
53
disregard was intentional.
Despite this, in Windmill Estates, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Totowa, 54 the trial judge made an imaginative attempt to
50 Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of Carteret, 170 N.J. Super. 461, 47677, 406 A.2d 1322, 1330 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Southern Burlington Councy N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
5'
This lack of sympathy, bordering on outright hostility, was also apparent in other cases.
See, e.g., Round Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clinton, 173 N.J. Super. 45, 51 n.7, 413 A.2d 356,
358 n.7 (App. Div. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983), where the
appellate division ducked the regional need, fair share, and developing municipality questions as "moot," notwithstanding that these critical determinations underlay any remedial order
of the trial court, including the specific rezoning problems which the court itself addressed.
52 N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:55-D-1 to -99 (West Cui. Supp. 1983-1984) [hereinafter cited as
MLUL].
11 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 318-21, 456 A.2d at 473-74 (discussion of MLUL's legislative
history).
14 147 N.J. Super. 65, 74, 370 A.2d 541, 546 (Law Div. 1976), rev'd, 158 N.J. Super. 179,
385 A.2d 924 (App. Div. 1978).
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read the MLUL in pari materia with Mount Laurel, and came to the
conclusion that the legislature had implicitly adopted Mount Laurel's
general welfare logic on a statewide basis, without regard to whether
a municipality could be characterized as "developing." 55 Accordingly,
he ordered relief from exclusionary provisions in the ordinance of a
suburban municipality. While still pending on appeal, the Windmill
Estates holding was specifically disavowed by the supreme court,5 6
and on the basis of this "hint," the trial judge was overruled when his
decision eventually came before the appellate division. 57 In subsequent decisions, the supreme court would go no further than to suggest that the MLUL was not inconsistent with the holding in Mount
58
Laurel.
Reflecting the irrelevance of the MLUL to the exclusionary zoning problem, specific regional zoning legislation was introduced in the
New Jersey Legislature; 59 the bill, however, was never enacted into
law. In addition, the governor entered the fray, which was somewhat
surprising given the obvious political risks involved. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 35, issued on April 2, 1976,60 a state-wide study of
housing needs was undertaken by the Department of Community
Affairs, and it was announced that compliance with the fair share
allocations that were to result from this study would be used as a basis
for awarding discretionary state grants to municipalities. 6'
A draft of the Housing Allocation Report (HAR) 62 resulted from
Executive Order No. 35, but to avoid having the matter become an
issue in the 1977 gubernatorial election, the study was recommitted by
executive order for a further year of study. 63 Although the revised
version of the HAR thereafter became publicly available, it never
became an operational document, and was eventually withdrawn by
a newly elected governor while the Mount Laurel II decision was still
64
being written.

ss See id. at 74-76, 370 A.2d at 546-47.
Washington Township, 74 N.J. at 486 n.4, 379 A.2d at 14 n.4.
Windmill Estates, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 158 N.J. Super. 179, 385 A.2d 924
(App. Div. 1978).
See Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 547 n.47, 371 A.2d at 1225 n.47.
s See S. 505, 198th N.J. Leg., 1st Sess. (1978).
60 Exec. Order No. 35, 1976 N.J. Laws 665.
"I The governor's legal authority to proceed, at least until implementation of the sanctions
was attempted, was upheld by the appellate division. See Markert v. Byrne, 154 N.J. Super. 410,
381 A.2d 806 (App. Div. 1977).
62 Department of Community Affairs, A Revised Statewide Housing Allocation Report for
New Jersey (1978).
63 Exec. Order No. 46, 1976 N.J. Laws 685.
64 Exec. Order No. 6 (slip form) (May 4, 1982).
56
17
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On both the legislative and executive fronts, then, the enunciation of the Mount Laurel doctrine did little to focus political attention
on the exclusionary zoning problem. Indeed, the apparent political
hostility undercut the legitimacy of a purely judicial solution to the
problem, to the extent that considerations of "general welfare" may be
said to have some relationship to the general attitudes of the populace
at any given moment. In this context, the New Jersey Supreme Court's
response to Windmill Estates looks like a missed opportunity to force
the legislature to face the problem, which it would have had to do in
order to modify the broad construction placed on the MLUL by the
5
Windmill Estates court.
The lesson of the Mount Laurel experience in New Jersey between 1975 and 1980 is that in order to provoke political attention to
any given problem, a certain judicial aggressiveness must be displayed, and that the failure to be aggressive may result in the waste of
such judicial time as is expended on. a more modest approach.
Whether the New Jersey Supreme Court would be willing to face this
imperative, even at the cost of disregarding some aspects of its Mount
Laurel I trilogy, was the overarching question posed by the six cases
taken on appeal in early 1980.
II.

APPROACHING MOUNT LAUREL

II

The Mount Laurel II court was quite differently composed from
that which had heard the earlier cases,6 6 and its determination to
shape the litigation in order to make a significant statement on the
exclusionary zoning problem was apparent from the outset. After
following the technical procedures necessary to place the six cases
before it, but before any briefing other than petitions for certification
had taken place, the court itself moved to organize the issues on
appeal. By letter to all counsel, the court propounded twenty-four
questions (some including subparts) and requested that counsel address only these questions in their briefs. 7 Although the court represented that its list was simply a distillation of the questions included in
the certification petitions, the selection and organization of the ques-

6- See inJra note 149. See generally infra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
6 Only Justices Sullivan, Pashman, and Clifford participated in both decisions. Chief Justice
Hughes and Justices Jacobs, Hall, and Mountain on the Mount Laurel I court were replaced by
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Schreiber, Handler, and Pollock. Justice Pashman retired after
oral argument and before decision in Mount Laurel II but was permitted under New Jersey
practice to vote on the final disposition of the case.
7 Letter from Stephen Townsend, Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court, to all counsel
(Apr. 28, 1980). The text of this letter, including the 24 questions discussed below, is set out in
Appendix A, infra.
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tions clearly represented the Justices' own sense of what important
issues had to be addressed if the Mount Laurel doctrine was to work.
The twenty-four questions ranged from narrow to cosmic, constituting an extraordinary compilation of the issues which had brewed in
the intervening years. At one extreme were conventional legal questions, dealing with burdens of proof, for example;68 at the other
extreme were open-ended socioeconomic inquiries such as the request
to evaluate the validity of the "trickle down" theory of housing supply.69' In between, a host of questions addressed the effectiveness of the
Mount Laurel doctrine;70 the court's proper relationship to the executive and legislative branches; 71 the possibility of reconsidering Washington Township; 72 the role of planners; 73 and possible new lines of
doctrinal approach .7
Briefing proceeded in response to the twenty-four questions and
oral argument was set for October 20-22, 1980. These arguments
proved to be as novel as the briefing format from which they were
derived. The Chief Justice, in his opening remarks on the first morning of the oral argument, directed all counsel to deal solely with the
general issues posed by the twenty-four questions, rather than dwelling on the facts of each case. 75 He also required that a particular order
of arguments be followed, thus establishing what amounted to a
formal program. The court grouped the twenty-four questions into
fourteen logical segments. 76 Segments I-III dealt with the scope of the
Mount Laurel doctrine. Segments IV-VI covered proofs of violation
and Segments VII-X covered remedial issues. Segments XI-XIV were
described as "policy issues," and served to wrap up the three days of
arguments.
As in conventional oral argument, each segment was allotted a
specific number of minutes, but there were too many lawyers involved
to allow each to participate in every segment. To solve this problem,
the litigants were required to divide the argument time amongst
themselves. Chief Justice Wilentz noted that:
[W]hen someone is arguing and represents a plaintiff, or is an
amicus allied with plaintiff, we are going to assume that he or she
See Appendix A, infra, Question (10).
Id., Question (19); see supra note 15 for a discussion of the "trickle down" ("filter down")
theory.
70 Appendix A. infra, Question (5).
71 Id., Questions (3), (4), (11), (12).
72 Id., Question (7).
71 Id., Question (23).
" Id., Question (3).
75 Tape 1(A).0. The citation system for tape excerpts is described supra note 4.
7" The court's schedule for oral arguments is set out in full in Appendix B, infra.
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speaks for all plaintiffs unless something to the contrary is said and
the same for someone who is arguing for a defendant. We will
assume that the positions taken represent those of all defendants
unless something to the contrary is said, or unless it is rather clear
77
to us from our knowledge of the case that that is not the case.
In practice, each segment of the argument was addressed by one
lawyer representing poor people, one representing developers, and
one representing defendant-municipalities.
The effort to keep the argument on a relatively abstract plane
was not wholly successful. Although numerous speakers made reference to the court's request for counsel to proceed without unnecessary
reference to the complex facts of specific cases, virtually all chose to
present examples involving some aspect of the case in which they had
actually participated. This is hardly surprising, both because familiarity invites illustration and because the lawyer selected for each segment was usually the one who had tried the case that raised the issue
of that segment most clearly. The Mahwah litigants, for instance,
bore much of the burden of arguing the least-cost housing problem,
and therefore much of the argument in that segment focused on the
Mahwah facts.
It is difficult to convey the flavor of the arguments, which extended over two full consecutive days and the major part of a third,
without having experienced them or having heard the tapes. Two
comments, however, fairly summarize them. First, the members of
the court clearly had prepared themselves thoroughly and took the
oral argument process seriously. Second, the focus of the court was less
on typical manipulation of legal doctrine than on exploration of the
factual context within which solutions lay. Thus, in Segment III,
when the speaker noted for the court that he represented a builder
actually seeking to construct Mount Laurel housing, the court responded to him almost as if he were an expert witness at a legislative
hearing, peppering him with questions about the mechanics of building low-cost housing. 78 The same process occurred with defendantmunicipalities in Segment X with respect to the impact of the proposed builder's remedy on local planning concerns.
At the outset, the Chief Justice noted the potential unfairness in
the collectivized method of arguing the case:
We want to assure you ...

that we are not going to lose sight of the

fact that ultimately we have six cases before us with particular

17

78

Tape I(A).0.
Tape 5 (A).2.
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factual issues, particular legal issues, and we will ultimately concentrate on the resolution of those cases. If after all of this we feel
that there is any need for further oral arguments in a conventional
7
way about particular cases we will have such argument. 1
Eventually, the court concluded that a second round of argument on a
case by case basis would be desirable, and this was allocated a single
day in December 1980.
From December 1980 until Mount Laurel II was announced on
January 20, 1983, exclusionary zoning litigation in New Jersey ceased
for all practical purposes. The case which began with an extraordinary set of judicial procedures thus ended with an extraordinary
hiatus during which the court's ability to handle the remedial problem
came increasingly into question. Whether Mount Laurel II was worth
the wait is, in major part, the focus of the present symposium. Part III
turns now to some additional fuel for that debate.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOUSING

Before turning to those parts of the oral argument bearing on the
constitutional theory of Mount Laurel II, the scene will be set with
several colloquies between the court and various speakers about the
underlying viability of the concept of nonexclusionary zoning established in Mount Laurel I.
A. The Viability of Mount Laurel I
The Mount Laurel II opinion strongly reaffirms the court's commitment to the underlying concept of nonexclusionary zoning expressed by Justice Hall in Mount Laurel I, just as the Madison Township decision had done six years earlier. 80 As was noted in Part I
above, the litigation history of the Mount Laurel doctrine up to 1980
justified concern about whether the court truly intended to stay the
course, and thus the language reaffirming the constitutional standard
was an important signal of the court's attitude. Unlike the situation at
the time of Madison Township in 1977, however, the court in 1980
took pains to signal at the argument itself that the Mount Laurel
concept was not open to question and that the court's focus was on
what would be required to implement the doctrine effectively.
The first speaker to address the court was Carl Bisgaier, representing the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, which
had been involved from the start in the Mount Laurel case itself and in
" Tape I(A).O.
10 See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Madison Township
decision.

1984]

MOUNT LAUREL SYMPOSIUM

903

one form or another in most of the other five cases on appeal. After a
brief introductory presentation by Mr. Bisgaier, the first question of
the court, put by the Chief Justice, was as follows:
THE COURT: Do you understand that any of the parties here, any
of the municipalities here, are urging that Mount Laurel be overruled?
MR. BISGAIER: Directly, no. Effectively, I think it has been
overruled in the Mahwah case.8 '
THE COURT: What do you conceive the Mount Laurel doctrine to
be?
MR. BISGAIER: I conceive the Mount Laurel doctrine to be the
mandate that all developing municipalities must act affirmatively
to provide a realistic housing opportunity for citizens. Where a
fundamental need has been established, that is, the need for shelter, the government can be shown to have the opportunity on the
local level to act, to enable shelter to be provided; the government
has the constitutional mandate to act. In a nutshell, that [is] ...
82
the Mount Laurel principle.
This exchange illustrates the court's determination both to recognize
the existence of the doctrine and to assure its implementation. This
sentiment was repeated in the dialogue of several other speakers representing defendant-municipalities; each dutifully concurred that the

doctrine itself was not in question, but only the method of implemen83
ting it.

The sole exception to this unanimity, offered by John E. Patton
in behalf of the Township of Mount Laurel, provides a vivid illustration of why that case remains in the courts after fifteen years of

litigation:
MR. PATTON: Well, I think, Your Honor, if you want to go that
far [with affirmative action devices] then I think you have to be
honest with yourself and say, we're not dealing with a zoning case
anymore, we're not dealing with a housing case anymore, we're
involving the judiciary in housing economics. And I simply don't
think it's a function of the court, given your example, to start
reading all these regulations and creating fair share numbers and
creating regions. No, I don't think that's the proper judicial function.

" The case referred to was Urban League of Essex County v. Township of Mahwah, No. L17112-71 slip op. (Law Div. Mar. 8, 1979), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Southern Burlington
County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 339,456 A.2d 391, 484 (1983).
Tape I(A). 1.
83 See, e.g., Tape l(B).8. (response of J. William Barba, representing a large number of
12

individual state legislators as amici in support of defendant-municipalities).
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THE COURT: You don't think we should be in this in the first
place, which gets to the question of the Mount Laurel doctrine
itself.
MR. PATTON: That's right.
THE COURT: But being in it, and this court having said what it
said, and having identified a constitutional shortcoming-you'll
agree with that thus far, is that right?
MR. PATTON: I don't thinkTHE COURT:-Maybe I shouldn't ask that question.
MR. PATTON:-What you believe is the constitutional shortcoming. I don't believe the Mount Laurel decision stands for a constitu84
tional right to housing.
This exchange, which continued for some time in the same vein,
suggests that counsel was either alone among his colleagues in misjudging the mood of the court or he was simply reflecting the mood of
his client, whose exercise of good faith in complying with Mount
Laurel I was questioned by the court. 85 At any rate, these questions
about Mount Laurel I left little doubt about the underlying direction
of the court's thinking.
B. The Constitutional Basis of Mount Laurel II
1. The Opinion
The court's discussion of the constitutional underpinnings of the
Mount Laurel doctrine occupies scarcely four pages of the 216-page
opinion, serving mainly to reiterate the court's strong commitment to
"concepts of fundamental fairness and decency."'86 The opinion names
three specific constitutional concepts-the general welfare, substantive due process, and equal protection,8 7 but it then ties them into
what it describes as a state and local government monopoly on the use
of land:
The basis for the constitutional obligation is simple: the State controls the use of land, all of the land. In exercising that control it
cannot favor rich over poor .... While the State may not have the
ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use that condition as the
basis for imposing further disadvantages. And the same applies to
the municipality, to which this control over land has been constitu88
tionally delegated.
84

Tape 10(B).2.

85 Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 294-95, 304-05 & n.55, 456 A.2d at 460, 465 & n.55.
86 Id. at 209-10, 456 A.2d at 415.
87 Id. at 208-09, 456 A.2d at 415.
88 Id. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415 (emphasis in original).
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The opinion also describes land use controls as affecting "something as
fundamental as housing."8 9
The import of these passages is unclear. The emphasis on state
monopoly of land use does not suggest any more than that governments should be required to perform neutrally with respect to the
housing problem, neither encouraging nor discouraging production of
any particular kind of housing units. The reminder that the state does
not have the ability or, more accurately, the obligation, to eliminate
poverty, would be consistent with this premise.
The long remainder of the Mount Laurel II opinion works to the
opposite conclusion, however, presaged by the phrase "something as
fundamental as housing." The novelty of Mount Laurel II lies in its
decision to establish performance standards for local governments:
Satisfaction of the Mount Laurel obligation shall be determined
solely on an objective basis: if the municipality has in fact provided
a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of low
and moderate income housing, it has met the Mount Laurel obligation .. .; if it has not, then it has failed to satisfy it. Further,
whether the opportunity is "realistic" will depend on whether there
is in fact a likelihood-to the extent economic conditions allowthat the lower income housing will actually be constructed. 90
Having established such standards, the court then required affirmative steps to reach these goals, through such devices as mandatory setaside ordinances, tax abatements, and the use of available subsidy
funds. 9 '
Aggressive affirmative obligations have been imposed upon defendants in the past, most notably in the school desegregation cases in
the federal courts.9 2 In such cases, however, the defendant's past
actions usually have been viewed as having distorted natural forces
that would otherwise have been at work in the society; and extraordinary action is justified as a necessary means of restoring a "normal"
state of affairs. Affirmative action in the Mount Laurel II sense does
not depend upon such an argument. The court did not limit its
affirmative obligations to cases in which constitutional violations oc"

Id. at 208, 456 A.2d at 415.

90 Id. at 220-22, 456 A.2d at 421-22 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

Ol See id. at 258-78, 456 A.2d at 441-52.
92 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1971) (equity
powers of court included prescribing busing as remedy in school desegregation cases); see also
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 38 (1971); E. REUTTER & R. HAMILTON, THE
LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, ch. 13, at 622-84 (2d ed. 1976). See generally Kurland, Brown v.
Board of Education Was the Beginning-The School DesegregationCases in the United States
Suprme Court, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 309.
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cur and, indeed, it could not have done so consistently with the use of
the SDGP and with the recognition of the statewide obligation of
municipalities to deal with their resident poor. 3 Instead, these devices
cause the Mount Laurel obligation to be applied to numerous municipalities whose conduct is unconstitutional only because of the objective standard constitutionally imposed upon them.
This point was made early in the oral argument by Carl Bisgaier
for the Public Advocate:
The first question the late Chief Justice Weintraub asked in the
Mount Laurel argument was . . . [whether] these principles ...

[were] based on a punitive notion-did Mount Laurel do something wrong so we should punish Mount Laurel? Or, did Mount
Laurel do something wrong and we should correct that wrong? . .
• And the position that was taken, and the position that was upheld
in the Mount Laurel case, was that the legal obligation to create
this housing opportunity arose in the constitution and was an obli94
gation on the part of the municipality.

What emerges, then, is an imperfectly delineated recognition,
modified to some unstated extent by economic limitations, of an
affirmative obligation on the part of the state and its subdivisions to
function as a provider of last resort when the private market fails.
This can only mean that Mount Laurel II is the seedbed of a state
constitutional right to some uncertain form of housing entitlement.
2. The Oral Argument
Can the oral argument help to illuminate in any way this obscure
state of affairs? At the outset, the transcript demonstrates that the
constitutional problem was clearly presented to the court. In the first
presentation of the first day, the Public Advocate's representative,
Carl Bisgaier, was asked:
THE COURT: That's one point, I think, as I read through these
five feet of briefs, one sharp difference between the thoughts expressed by your Department and other plaintiffs and the defendants. They read Mount Laurel, I think, by saying that it's sufficient, as Justice Schreiber has suggested, that they simply not have
exclusionary zoning, and you read it in a manner in which I think is
implicit if not explicit in your statement that there's a further
obligation, that it's not enough that you don't have exclusionary
zoning. You must have a meaningful solution of the problem, go
o' See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 214, 243, 456 A.2d at 418, 433.
'4 Tape l(A).4.
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further, and there's a variety of remedies that you suggest along
those lines. Is that a fair statement or not?
MR. BISGAIER: It's a fair statement. . . . In 1970 when I met
with Ethel Lawrence, [an individual plaintiff], to discuss this problem she was having in Mount Laurel Township, and in 1975 when
we were before this court, in 1972 and 1974 when we were before
this court, implicit-explicit-in everything that was being said
was that government simply cannot sit back when it has the power
to do it. To whom else could we look? To whom else are low and
moderate income persons to look for the remedy to the conditions
under which they are living today? If we can, government has that
power. If we can show-and in fact it has been shown in this state
and states throughout the country that government has had the
power on the local level to enhance the housing opportunities for
low income persons-can they not act? Can they constitutionally
say: "Well, we have chosen not to."? 95
Richard Bellman, plaintiffs' attorney in the Mahwah case, was
asked the question from a different perspective:
THE COURT: Do I infer . . . that you are saying that the endeavor of housing and providing housing has become so impressed
with a public interest and so impacts upon the public welfare that
one engaged in that business can justifiably be expected to do it less
profitably? -Just as one who runs a nursing home, or an old age
home?
MR. BELLMAN: If it comes to that, yes . ... 9
His response, however, which continued after the brief answer quoted
above and into a later dialogue with the court, sought to deflect the
housing issue back into traditional land use categories:
MR. BELLMAN: [W]e do this in all cases, we impose exactions, we
impose limitations, and this is done by the nature of zoning. When
land is zoned for a single house on one acre, that developer is told
the profitability that you will gain from your land is one house on
an acre. It's always there, it's always a limitation and so to simply
add, when creating multi-family classifications, a requirement of
low and moderate [housing] which will perhaps lower the profitability-it's doing what has always been done under Euclidean
zoning.
THE COURT: Are you comfortable in characterizing [this extension] as all an aspect of zoning . . .?
Tape I(A).3.
96 Tape 2(B). 1. The nursing home reference derives from In re Health Care Admin. Bd., 83

N.J. 67, 415 A.2d 1147, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 944 (1980), in which the court sustained a
regulation requiring a certain number of nursing home beds to be provided to the indigent.
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MR. BELLMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: [A]s opposed to areas that might otherwise be described as housing or building codes or the like?
MR. BELLMAN: I'm still troubled by this [claim] that this is a
housing and not a zoning case. And I want to emphasize the
importance that the plaintiff's attach to Justice Pashman's language
in the Weymouth"7 case. Justice Pashman, in a decision in which
all of the justices joined him, said that the Mount Laurel obligation
cannot be met if the municipality cannot shape its regulations to
specifically address the housing needs.9 8 And Justice Pashman also
said as a conceptual matter that regulation of land use cannot be
precisely disassociated from regulation of land users. 99 Now he was
dealing with that of course in the context of retirement communities for the elderly, but why is that a zoning decision and the
question of providing housing through land use mechanisms for
lower income people becomes a housing mechanism? We say
there's no difference and the language in Weymouth is extremely
critical to what we are asking the court to do in the Mahwah case
and the other cases before you.100
The heart of this issue came on the third day of the oral argument, in a series of dialogues involving several members of the court
and S. David Brandt, the attorney for Davis Enterprises, which was
the intervenor-plaintiff in the Mount Laurel case seeking to provide
mobile home units in the township. The first series of questions seems
to indicate the court's appreciation that the concept of affirmative
measures implies something more than the simple resolution of a
zoning controversy:
THE COURT: That depends on what the perception of the constitutional wrong is, obviously. If the perception is that it is to remove
exclusionary zoning, one set of consequences flows. If the perception is that it is to go beyond that, to take affirmative steps, then
another set of consequences might reasonably flow. Now, with

Taxpayers Ass'n v. Weymouth Township, 80 N.J. 6, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). In Weymouth,
several property owners and taxpayers challenged the validity of a municipal ordinance that
permitted mobile home parks only for senior citizens as an exception to the town's general zoning
policy which prohibited mobile homes. Id. at 15-16, 364 A.2d at 1021-22. Addressing several
arguments advanced by the parties, see id. at 20-45, 364 A.2d at 1023-37, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinances. Id. at 54, 364 A.2d at 1042.
98 See id. at 50, 364 A.2d at 1040.
9 Id. at 34, 364 A.2d at 1031.
'0' Tape 2(B).l., .3.
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respect to the court's role and the legislature's role, if a constitutional violation is found and there is no remedy, then it seems to me
there's no point in-[T]hese questions suggest that in determining
the constitutional violation, if you phrase the constitutional mandate as a requirement that the zoning provisions not be restrictive,
you might find one kind of remedy by the court, while if you
phrase it in terms of a requirement that the housing actually be
provided, you might find a different remedy. So that it suggests
that perhaps when we get beyond zoning into what's asserted to be
"housing," at that point we're intruding on the legislative province. 10 1
The response to these tandem questions again deflected the housing basis back to zoning, and led to a wide ranging exchange involving
several justices:
MR. BRANDT: Let me try to clarify that, because I do not see the
implementation of housing as the issue. If an order says the municipality must amend its zoning ordinance, the municipality can still
have an underlying permissible land use, for example, on a tract
• . . say the half acre zone, but it may be required to have a second
layer of permissible zoning, which is the opportunity level, for low
and moderate income people. . . . Now, the court is not ordering
that any house be built. The court is simply ordering that a second
layer of opportunity be provided so that a developer in the private
market, or a limited dividend housingTHE COURT: -That could be expressed as a zoning provision.
MR. BRANDT: Precisely.
THE COURT: But wouldn't you go farther, or would you? Do you
read Mount Laurel to be limited so that what we're really concerned about here as a constitutional matter is something that
might be called a zoning law? Or would you read Mount Laurel at
its heart to be especially concerned that government regulations,
whatever they be, be affirmatively used to provide for low and
moderate income housing?
MR. BRANDT: As I read the case itself, it did not go to the point of
saying that the municipality, for example, had to form a housing
authority. It specifically indicated it might be a moral obligation,
but not a legal requirement.
THE COURT: Were you going to go farther on that housingzoning distinction, Mr. Brandt?
MR. BRANDT: I am suggesting, in my answer to the question, that
the court is not intruding into the housing field and ordering hous101

Tape 10(A).3.
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ing, it is taking the municipality to the point where it maximizes
the opportunity for housing, by knocking down the barriers, but
not saying, this town must form a housing authority today.
THE COURT: Mr. Brandt, wouldn't you agree that the constitutional principle enunciated in Mount Laurel is simply that it is
contrary to the general welfare as provided in the constitution for a
municipality to exclude low and moderate income housing within
its boundaries? Isn't that simply the entire constitutional principle?
MR. BRANDT: I would suggest it was also based upon the deprivation of individual personal rights, of persons whoTHE COURT: All right, supposing we modify it to that extent, but
that's the . . . ratio decidendi of the case from a constitutional
standpoint.
MR. BRANDT: No doubt about it.
THE COURT: And secondly,wouldn't you agree that there may be
some constitutional violations where there is no judicial remedy?
MR. BRANDT: But where a remedy is availableTHE COURT: No, I'm just putting the question to you as an
abstract principle.
MR. BRANDT: Okay. As a matter of abstract principle, I'm sure
that there are circumstances when there is a violation without a
remedy. But if the remedy is available, I can't imagine your not
using it. 0 2
Several points emerge from these exchanges between court and
counsel. The possibility that the Mount Laurel doctrine has housing
rights implications beyond simple land use controversies seems to have
been recognized all around. Although members of the court pressed
counsel to expand upon this theory more than once, only the Public
Advocate seemed to have been willing to embrace the idea fully; the
other speakers consistently turned the inquiry back to at least an
appearance of conventional zoning analysis.
Nor were the Justices themselves wholly enthusiastic about the
proposition. The suggestion of rights without remedies implies a legitimate concern that restating the basis of the Mount Laurel doctrine
might take the court much too far afield in complex doctrinal consequences, and the emphasis on a narrow reading of Mount Laurel I
highlights this concern. Keeping in mind that Mount Laurel II was,
against all odds, a unanimous opinion, it may well be that some
compromise on this issue was necessary. This increases the significance
of the court's observation that the remedial options could be stated in
a zoning ordinance, and suggests that this was seen as an adequate
102

Tape 10(A).2.
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basis for decision without confronting the larger and more troubling
questions addressed in the oral argument.
It also bears mention, although not specifically noted in the
argument, that the "general welfare" standard relied upon in Mount
Laurel I and II was specifically read into the "police power" phrase of
the zoning clause of the state constitution, 103 even though it is derived
from the broader rights and liberties article. 0 4 Emphasis on the zoning component of the problem reinforces this constitutional link without seriously limiting the court's remedial powers, as the passage
about Weymouth Township demonstrates. 0 5
That the broad implications of a housing rights theory were not
lost on the court, however, is demonstrated by an exchange during the
Public Advocate's presentation. He was asked a question about the
fiscal impact of Mount Laurel on local governments, both in terms of
New Jersey's Local Government Cap Law'0 6 and more generally in
terms of possible tax increases if more poor people were resident in a
given community. He responded:
MR. BISGAIER: It is true that for publicly subsidized housing, the
payment in lieu of taxes requirement would result in perhaps a
lesser tax ratable for the municipality than the municipality might
otherwise get, but I don't think it's ever been suggested by anybody
that that would be so dramatic as to impact on the caps. And a
much more important point [than] that: It's not a question of
whether people are going to live. They're alive, and they're going
to be living. The question is, whether they're going to be housed
adequately. It's not a question of whether they're . . . going to be
housed, because they're going to be housed somewhere. Somebody
[is going to] experience the impact of [poor] persons living in New
Jersey from the tax point of view ....
MR. BISGAIER: I guess if it could be shown that in a specific
municipality, as a result of the introduction of a certain number of
103

N.J. CONST., art. IV, § 6, para. 2 provides:
The Legislature may enact general laws under which municipalities, other than
counties, may adopt zoning ordinances limiting and restricting to specified districts
and regulating therein, buildings and structures, according to their construction,
and the nature and extent of their use, and the nature and extent of the uses of land,
and the exercise of such authority shall be deemed to be within the police power of
the State. Such laws shall be subject to repeal or alteration by the Legislature.

Id.

104See N.J.

CONST.,

art. I, para. 1.

10' See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (statement of Mr. Bellman).
106 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-45.1-10 (West 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). The Act was
intended to place limits on expenditures by counties and municipalities. It was enacted as an
experiment to take effect in 1978 and to expire on December 31, 1982. An amendment extended
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units, the tax would be impacted in such a way as to require the
municipality doing the kinds of things municipalities do when they
want to raise more money, my answer would still be, absolutely
not[, it may not exclude.] . . . . [T]he court in Mount Laurel very
specifically talked about the fundamental questionsTHE COURT: You would say that it's a legislative problem?
MR. BISGAIER: It's a legislative problem and . . . the fundamental problem here is people. They're the one[s] we are collecting the
taxes for.
MR. BISGAIER: If they have needs, and the legislature has established a system which is not being responsive to their needs, well,
they represent the people and they can change it. I don't believe
that is necessary.
THE COURT: Wasn't that our basis for Justice Hall's opinion [in
Mount Laurel I]? He makes it quite clear that the reason you have
this practice of exclusionary zoning is for these very . . . fiscal
reasons. The very point that the Chief Justice alluded to a moment
ago. . . . [Justice Hall] said that was the primary reason why [the]
municipality had adopted exclusionary zoning. They didn't want
the municipal burdens that came with having people of low income
living in the municipality without bringing along comparable ratables.
MR. BISGAIER: That's the nicest possible way to characterize the
municipal intent, that it was based solely on the fear that the tax
rate would increase. But in any event, the reality is that somebody
in the State of New Jersey is dealing with these tax problems that
are raised. In this municipality or in that municipality it's got to be
dealt with because. . . these people. . . are alive and services have
10 7
to be provided to them.
This passage comes close to suggesting that one consequence of
the Mount Laurel doctrine is that either municipalities or the state
will have to shoulder additional financial burdens when poor people
are permitted to locate without regard to offsetting tax ratables.
Recognition of a constitutionally-based right to housing in some form
would of course enhance such an argument.
The court itself strengthened the linkage between the constitutional basis of Mount Laurel and fiscal politics in an exchange with
the effective dates through the year 1983, see L. 1982, c. 225, § 1; and in 1983 the law was again
amended and made to apply through 1986. 1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 49, no. 2, at 324

(West).
107

Tape I(A).9., I(B).O.
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Daniel S. Bernstein, counsel for Piscataway in the Urban League
case, 08 at a much later point in the argument. In arguing that the
HAR should not be used by the courts as a basis for calculating
housing need, Mr. Bernstein contended that the Report improperly
relieved the City of Newark of the burden of housing its own resident
poor.
MR. BERNSTEIN: There's 2,500 dilapidated buildings [in Newark]. Every time I'm in the courts in Newark I see new commercial
facilities. I seeTHE COURT: Well, they have an allocation to Newark....
MR. BERNSTEIN: The allocation to Newark, Your Honor, does
not even cover the existing need....
THE COURT: You allocate the overneed to other areas, I assume.
MR. BERNSTEIN: The overneed is excessive. They assume that
Newark cannot rehabilitate its existing structures and if we believe
that each municipality has an obligation to take care of at least its
own, does Newark have the same obligation, or can Newark say,
"We're entitled to the colleges, the commercial structures, the industry, but we won't even rehabilitate existing housing for our own
resident poor."
THE COURT: Do you recognize the possibility that some municipalities may have an economic problem that is such that they
cannot accommodate their own resident poor properly?
MR. BERNSTEIN: We used to talk about fiscal zoning, Your
Honor, and the courts invariably said, "You cannot [apply] fiscal
zoning."' ° Are we saying that in suburban communities you cannot apply fiscal zoning but in the Newarks of this state fiscal zoning
applies?
THE COURT: Apparently, the planners recognize fiscal capabilities as one of the various considerations in determining region and
determining the appropriate allocation of low and moderate income housing. 10
In a kind of "confession and avoidance" response to these fiscal
facts, the Mount Laurel II opinion attempts, in a wholly unsatisfactory passage,'
to lay the fiscal consequences aside by arguing that its
earlier school finance decisions, beginning with Robinson v. Cahill
(Robinson I)112 in 1973, and the state income tax that resulted from

108See supra

notes 46-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Urban League case.
"Fiscal zoning" comprehends zoning employed "as a device to avoid school construction
and other governmental costs incident to population expansion." Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 18, 283 A.2d 353, 357 (Law Div. 1971), afJ'd and
modified, 72 N.J. 483, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
110Tape 11(A).27.
Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 238, 456 A.2d at 430.
112 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
10
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them, had satisfactorily equalized local fiscal capacities. This is simply
not true, not even with respect to education, 1 3 and certainly not with
respect to the broad range of other municipal services, most notably
public welfare." 4 The court's concern with keeping Mount Laurel
consequences within some bounds is readily apparent, however, and
clearly reinforced its unwillingness to confront the housing right question.
The constitutional dilemma that these passages between court
and counsel reflect is best illustrated by a final excerpt from the oral
argument. The speaker was Kenneth E. Meiser, also representing the
Department of the Public Advocate, who was addressing circumstances under which an ordinance should be found presumptively
invalid. He began by emphasizing an objective constitutional test
based on whether the defendant-municipality had achieved target
numbers of lower-income housing units contained in one of several
studies. This test, in modified form, was eventually incorporated into
Mount Laurel II: 1

5

MR. MEISER: Then, having shown that neither of these two conditions [the target numbers] has been met, the ordinance should be
presumptively invalid. We feel that this presumption of invalidity
test focuses on the real goal, not whether it's two units per acre, not
whether it's 30,000 square feet, but whether low and moderate
income people have a realistic opportunity to live in that town.
THE COURT: You have less confidence in the presumptive invalidity that attaches when restrictive devices are found in the ordinance?
MR. MEISER: Our feeling is, you've got to look at the ordinance as
a whole. If an ordinance is fantastic, but has one restrictive device,
if the sum total of the ordinance will allow low and moderate
income people in the town, then I'm not very concerned about that
one restrictive device....
THE COURT: I'll tell you one thing that troubles me, counselor

...Your approach would almost seem to characterize the ordinance itself as irrelevant. You seem to be focusing on an empirical
See Abbott v. Burke, No. C-1893-80 (Mercer County Ch. Div. May 11, 1984) (seeking
"J
further judicial enforcement of school finance remedies provided in Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J.
133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975)).
"' See Bonnet v. State, 155 N.J. Super. 520, 382 A.2d 1175 (App. Div. 1978) (challenging
state's method of financing public welfare and judicial administrative costs on a county by
county basis).
"5 See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 220-23, 456 A.2d at 421-22; see also supra text accompanying
note 90.
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test, namely, what do the numbers show, and then you assume that
one of the factors that might contribute to those unhealthy numbers is some invalidity in some ordinance, and you immediately
cast the burden upon the municipality to prove that its ordinance is
otherwise satisfactory. If you're going to proceed with a presumption of invalidity, don't you have to relate the figures as far as
housing [is concerned] more closely with the provisions of the
ordinance itself? ...
THE COURT: Do you think that experience now teaches us that
. . . where you do not have an adequate number of low and

moderate housing units accommodated in a particular municipality, that one reason is almost certain to be the inadequacy of its
zoning ordinance?
MR. MEISER: One reason, yes.
THE COURT: And that justifies as a matter of common experience
now a presumption of invalidity?
MR. MEISER: In our opinion, yes sir."6
C. Is There a ConstitutionallyProtected Right to Housing?
As both court and counsel recognized, the zoning ordinance is
one way that a municipality can unconstitutionally interfere with the
Mount Laurel right, but at the same time it is an empirical resultwhether affordable housing exists-that counts. Those who favor
more limited judicial activism (within the considerable activism inherent in any view of the Mount Laurel doctrine) can argue that
Mount Laurel litigation should focus on the ordinance, while those
looking ahead to the broader implications of a constitutionally recognized right to housing can emphasize the obligation to achieve empirical results. The arguments, like the opinion that flows from them,
seek to have it both ways.
Whether there should be a constitutionally recognized right to
housing in New Jersey and, if so, the full extent to which Mount
Laurel II bears on that right, are questions beyond the scope of this
paper. The effort here has been descriptive, to demonstrate that the
issue is one that was well within the consciousness of the court when it
grappled with the six cases, and that the litigation context of the
decisions makes it plausible to develop such arguments in future cases.
Questions from the bench do not bind the court to a point of
view, of course, nor do observations of counsel necessarily set the
"I6 Tape 3(B).1.
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outer limits of what the court considered in its private deliberations.
The court, as presently constituted, obviously prefers incremental
development of this question, if it is to be developed at all. At the
same time, however, the extended debate on this issue during the oral
argument suggests more clearly than the final opinion that the incremental possibilities are realistic ones, and invites attention to these
possibilities before they are forgotten.

IV.

METHODOLOGY AND JUDICIAL PROCESS

A large portion of the Mount Laurel II oral argument was concerned with problems of remedy, since that was the area in which
Mount Laurel I clearly was inadequate. Consistent with this focus,
the opinion in Mount Laurel II contains a number of procedural
innovations, several of which will be explored here against the background of the argument itself.
Perhaps the most dramatic shift in Mount Laurel II was the
court's decision to abandon the "developing municipality" approach 17 which had been articulated in Mount Laurel I,""and which
was apparently confirmed by the decisions in Washington Township
and Demarest. 19 In its place, the court placed primary reliance on the
SDGP, which designated "growth," "limited growth," and "nongrowth" areas, 1 20 and held that any municipality containing a
"growth" area would have a Mount Laurel obligation. 121
At the same time, however, the court declined to permit use of a
parallel state document, the 1978 HAR, as the basis for a numerical
remedy in Mount Laurel cases.1 22 The drafters of the HAR had developed a regional fair share methodology and had assigned specific
numerical goals for low and moderate income units to each municipality in the state. The report, however, had been treated cautiously
by the administration of Governor Brendan Byrne and was thereafter
disavowed by the newly-elected Governor, Thomas Kean, in 1982.123
In lieu of the HAR methodology, or any other, the court decided to
assign all future Mount Laurel litigation to a maximum of three trial
judges, each responsible for a portion of the state, and each expected

l7 See Mt. Laurel I,

92 N.J. at 215, 456 A.2d at 418.

'lS See Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 160, 171, 336 A.2d at 717, 723.
Il

122

See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
See Mt. Laurel I, 92 N.J. at 225-36, 336 A.2d at 423-30.
Id. at 237, 336 A.2d at 430.
Id. at 251, 336 A.2d at 437-38.

123

Id.

120

121
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to develop sufficient expertise to ensure that a consistent methodology
would emerge in due course.
As a matter of legal process, the methodology that results from
these decisions is dazzingly inconsistent. On the one hand, in departing from the Washington Township and Demarest decisions, the court
achieved a high degree of certainty in its delineation of the Mount
Laurel obligation by rescuing from oblivion the executive branch's
SDGP; the court also seems to be heading in the same direction in its
emphasis on a numerical remedy, by departing from the numberless
approach of Madison Township. 124 On the other hand, the court
implements its insistence on a numerical remedy with a virtually
standardless commitment of the problem to the three Mount Laurel
judges, withholding the guidance and the certainty the HAR could
have provided. The oral arguments provide some interesting perspectives on these results.
A. The Viability of the SDGP and the HAR
The possible use of the SDGP and the HAR was noted in Questions Eleven and Twelve of the twenty-four questions propounded by
the court, 25 and both were specifically mentioned in the Chief Justice's opening remarks.1 26 The Chief Justice's request that argument be
concentrated in Segment XIII, one of the segments reserved for "policy issues," indicates the importance the court apparently attached to
27
the possible use of the SDGP and HAR.1
Plaintiff's argument on Segment XIII was presented by Kenneth
Meiser of the Department of the Public Advocate:
MR. MEISER: Our position on [the HAR] is that it should be
deemed presumptively valid as one of the two alternatives which a
municipality can utilize in determining its fair share and which is
one of two factors the court should look to in determining whether
an ordinance is presumptively invalid. The plaintiffs have the burden of showing the municipality has complied with neither the
[HAR] nor the proportional regional test. Turning to the State
Development Guide, our position is that [it] contains important
policies which a court can look to. However, giving full regard to
these advantages, the State Development Guide does not assist the
court in reaching this quantifiable approximation which we feel is
important.
124
12

See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
See Appendix A, infra.

126

Tape 1(A).0.
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See Appendix B, infra, Segments XI-XIV.
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MR. MEISER: Now, staying with the State Development Guide
for a moment, these principles in it are important. It is also important to realize, though, that the [HAR] was drawn up and claims to
be fully consistent with the State Development Guide. Pages 21 to
23 [of the HAR] talk about how the two are consistent, . . . . So
our primary emphasis is on the [HAR], for the reason that we need
a quantifiable approximation.
Turning back to Madison for a moment, there were five different opinions in [that] case. Each of those opinions supported the
concept of determining fair share on the basis of a legislative or
administrative plan. Over and over the opinions stressed that it's
not a judicial function to resolve the highly controversial economic,
social, and policy questions encompassed in fair share. In Madison,
the court recognized the importance of the [HAR] plan, . . . .128
The Public Advocate strongly urged the importance of achieving
a numerical solution, thus relegating the SDGP to a distinctly secondary role. The court could "look to" the policies of the SDGP, but it
was the HAR, into which the SDGP had been incorporated, that was
to be given presumptive effect. Given this strategy, it is not surprising
that the remainder of the Public Advocate's presentation focused completely on the HAR.
This focus was also maintained by other speakers in this segment,
with the SDGP getting only scattered references. Arnold Mytelka,
representing the City of Newark as amicus, noted testimony in City of
Newark v. Township West Milford 129 to the effect that the SDGP
growth zones had been developed without any effort to make them
conform to the "developing municipality" concept of Mount Laurel
1. 130 A similar point was made by J. William Barba, the representative
of the amici state legislators, who criticized the HAR methodology as
disregarding the explicit regional definitions of Madison Township.
An exchange with the court ensued, which led the discussion briefly
back to the SDGP:
THE COURT: Might not that suggest that there was something
perhaps unrealistic in the court's original perception of "region,"
which perhaps ought to be modified in light of the experience of
those who are actually dealing with these problems?
MR. BARBA: Respectfully, Mr. Justice, I don't think so. I think it's
the other way around. The court has applied itself to an attempt to
128

Tape 10(B).5.

28 No.L-25413-77 P.W. (Law Div. Mar. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. A-3240-80T2

(App. Div. Apr. 1983), certif. denied, 95 N.J. 175, 470 A.2d 403 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1416 (1984).
130 Tape 11(A).1.
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define "region" in Mount Laurel and then again in the [Madison
Township] caseTHE COURT: And now we have experts, authorized by their
governmental responsibilities to deal with these problems, and in
that particular area of the state those judicial definitions were
found to be wanting. There's nothing wrong in the lesson learned
from that experience, is there?
MR. BARBA: The problem that I'm addressing myself to is that the
DCA took a very simplistic approach to the designation of counties
[as regions]. . . . They don't take into consideration any of the
factors that the court wrestled with in attempting to define what
the appropriate region is.
THE COURT: Do you suppose the doctrine of separation of
powers calls for the court to give some deference to the determinations of these other branches of government? [laughter]
MR. BARBA: The [HAR] was a report that was generated as a
result of an executive order issued out of the Governor's Office, and
the executive order specifically directs the Director [of the Department of Community Affairs] to do the things the Governor wants
him to do. It's not a legislative mandate. The Guide Plan is a
legislative mandate to the Department of Community Affairs to do
thus and so, and to promulgate rules.
THE COURT: You have a quarrel with the Governor as well as the
courts, then.
MR. BARBA: No, I don't. I think the Governor has a large function
to play. He's one of the branches of government.
THE COURT: Mr. Barba, in your opinion, how does the Legislature treat these two reports? ....
They've received it and I'm sure
that there's discussion about it-what credence, and how do they
treat it by way of, possibly evidence or guidelines or whatever? Is
there anything at all you can tell us about its reaction to the filing
of these reports, which, as you say, find their genesis in an executive order, not a legislative fiat?
MR. BARBA: First of all, that's not true of the Guide Plan. The
Guide Plan's genesis is in legislation. ...
3
THE COURT: Thank you, that's right.' '
Daniel S. Bernstein, attorney for the Township of Piscataway in
the Urban League case, spent "one and a half minutes" on the SDGP,
en route to a much lengthier criticism of the HAR.
MR. BERNSTEIN: I'll just spend one and a half minutes on the
State Development Guide. It wasn't meant to be a planning tool, it

"I Tape

ll(A).3.
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was meant to be a tool for the State of New Jersey in its expenditure
of capital funds. Nevertheless, it employs what I've referred to
previously as a rational approach. It's been used by most planners,
not only in these exclusionary zoning cases, but in regular zoning
cases, as an indication of what DCA feels a region should be, what
is growth or slow growth, or a conservation area, so I take it that
the State Development Guide should be taken as a single factor,
certainly not an overwhelming one. As to the [HAR] .... 132
As revealed by the excerpts just set out, the HAR was the subject
of at least some criticism on the part of all counsel except the Public
Advocate. Mr. Mytelka argued that it was useful, but should be
supported by the courtroom testimony of an appropriate DCA official, and should be evidential rather than presumptive. Mr. Barba,
representing the legislators, challenged its provenance in an executive
order rather than a legislative mandate, and Mr. Bernstein seriously
questioned its methodology.
The court seemed less concerned with these arguments than with
the question of whether the HAR was sufficiently developed to be
judicially noticed as "official" state policy. Mr. Meiser was questioned
sharply on this issue:
MR. MEISER: In Madison, the court recognized the importance of
the [HAR], but did not give it prima facie approval because: "At
this point it is only tentative and subject to further public hearings
13
and review ....
THE COURT: Neither of which conditions havebeen corrected, to
the best of my knowledge.
MR. MEISER: The position of the Department of Community
Affairs is that for purposes of use the [HAR] is no longer tentative
and is not going to be subject to further public hearings. Now I'd
like to get into that for a secondTHE COURT: I think that's terribly important, because I know of
no other instance in state government where the state has acted
with respect to land use without first according the public an
opportunity to express itself. I refer to CAFRA, the meadowlands,
the wetlands, the pinelands, and it just seems to me on something
of this magnitude, that public hearings

. . .

in the fullest sense,-I

think as one of the parties suggested here, the planners in their
brief, administrative type hearings, with cross examination, explanation of methodology, and so forth, should go forward, and I
would solicit your comments in that regard.

132
133

Tape 11(A).4.
Tape 10(B).5 (quoting Madison Township, 72 N.J. at 538 n.43, 371 A.2d at 1220 n.43).
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MR. MEISER: A little history may be relevant. The Department of
Community Affairs did come up with a first preliminary report.
The Governor asked them to spend one year revising that plan.
They did extensively revise it. They did have extensive input from a
number of sources.
Now, I'm not representing the Department of Community
Affairs. I cannot tell you why, or whether they made the decision
[that] they would not have full formal hearings the way you want
it ....
THE COURT: Has the Commissioner signed off on that document?
MR. MEISER: It was released in the form you have as the Department of Community Affairs document. I believe that it has Mr.
LeFante's signature on it. The Department of Community Affairs
position, which is Mr. LeFante's position, in the Attorney General's
brief, is that it's now a workable yardstick for measuringTHE COURT: A workable yardstick is one thing. . . and I can see
where that document would have great utility, but when one starts
to accord it, in a judicial proceeding, prima facie validity without
first having had the methodology explained, [it] seems to me that
you're getting into a far different area ....
THE COURT: [There is one thing] that troubles me about this
whole thing. I think it's a useful document that should go-be
accorded some weight. But when there's some question that the
Department has issued it, when there's been no public hearings, I
find it genuinely troublesome, when no one in the public has the
opportunity-has had the opportunity of prior public hearing or
cross examination of the authors of the report before, to accord the
document primafacie proof of the facts set forth in the document.
MR. MEISER: A public hearing without the right of cross examination comes to an opportunity to comment. I think for a six month
or a year period there was such informal opportunity. Whether you
feel that the rises to the level of the minimum amount of fairness is
a questionTHE COURT: Do you know how much actual public input there
was during that period?
MR. MEISER: My understanding is that there was a number of
municipalities and a number of planners that were consulted.
THE COURT: But you don't know how many or what the procedure was?
MR. MEISER: There-I can only tell you as hearsay, but I under34
stand they were getting input.
Tape 1O(B).5. In an omitted portion of this exchange, the court also explored with Mr.
Meiser the admissibility of the SDGP under the New Jersey hearsay rule, N.J. R. EvID.
114
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Several preliminary observations can be made about these passages. First, there is the obvious irony that the argument focused
almost exclusively on the HAR, which the court eventually decided
not to incorporate into its methodology, while the SDGP, which was
barely mentioned by the parties or the court, became the centerpiece
of the Mount Laurel II opinion. On the other hand, it seems generally
to have been understood that the two documents, both products of the
planning apparatus of the Department of Community Affairs, were
quite closely related, even though one was mandated by the legislature and the other by the Governor exercising executive authority. In
light of this distinction in origin, the doubt that the court expressed
when closely questioning Kenneth Meiser about the legitimacy of the
HAR's official status undoubtedly bears also on the validity of the
SDGP, and the handling of this problem in the opinion deserves
scrutiny. Before doing so, however, an additional aspect of the Mount
Laurel II methodology needs to be introduced.
B. The "Developing Municipality" Limitation
Adoption of the SDGP necessarily implies rejection of the "developing municipality" approach which had grown out of Mount Laurel
1.135 The Mount Laurel II plaintiffs, however, did not sponsor this
approach. To the contrary, Carl Bisgaier for the Public Advocate
stuck vigorously to the "developing municipality" concept and went to
some lengths to distinguish the Washington Township and Demarest
cases in this regard.
THE COURT: Mr. Bisgaier, are you of the opinion that the principle of Mount Laurel as you understand it should only be applied to
a developing municipality? Is that still the position of your office?
MR. BISGAIER: Yes, .... However, in understanding what a
developing municipality is, I think we should go to the Mount
Laurel doctrine itself, which is a principle that arose to deal with
governmental action in municipalities that either were experiencing growth or should [have been] experiencing growth-where
growth was appropriate. In other words, not to exclude from
Mount Laurel [those] municipalities which chose not to grow in
situations where the housing need was such that the municipalities

63(15).The court ultimately held that once the document is authenticated under N.J. R. EVID. 67
"no hearsay problems exist." Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 246-47, 456 A.2d at 435.
...The Mount Laurel II court, however, expressly reserved the "developing municipality"
concept for use by trial courts in the event that the legislature invalidates the SDGP. Mt. Laurel
II, 92 N.J. at 248 n.21, 456 A.2d at 435 n.21.
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should have been acting to enable that growth. We believe that the
principles enunciated in the Washington Township and Demarest
cases-as those cases are read on their face for what they say-are
being essentially perverted by lower court opinions which have
expanded the notion to include municipalities which are now undergoing considerable growth, which have the opportunity to undergo further growth, and where the demographic characteristics
are such that planning agencies and municipal master planning
itself countenances further growth.
THE COURT: But Mr. Bisgaier, why should you reward a municipality which is fully developed, which has carried out these exclusionary practices and has been able to keep out of its town all of
these low cost housing situations, why should they be rewarded?
That is in effect what you would be doing. Why shouldn't those
municipalities also bear their "fair share" of the low cost housing in
the particular region in which they are located?
MR. BISGAIER: The answer to that is that such a municipality,
which has been exclusionary, and which is in a region where it can
be proved that there is a need for growth within that municipality
for low and moderate income housing, such a municipality by
choosing to refuse to permit such growth where there's opportunity
for it, would be inappropriately denied the opportunity for
growth. If I can just run down what I believe to be our basic
principle-basic position on that, then I think it may become
clearer. In Washington and Demarest, the court found that there
were no proofs that there was a resident population in need of
housing. The court found that there were no proofs that there were
any local employees in need of housing. There was no proof that
[infill] or redevelopment was occurring at all, or that [infill] or
redevelopment would be appropriate in Washington Township or
Demarest Township. And furthermore, the case came up, ironically, with developers in both cases who were choosing to take that
little land that was left and provide luxury housing on that land. [It
was] hardly a case where there were compelling proofs that Washington and Demarest were failing to respond to low and moderate
income housing needs. Our position in that regard is-well, it's a
far extension of that case to countenance the position of, say, South
Plainfield-where you had a municipality with thousands of employees and vacant land and a substantial resident poor saying,
"We're Washington Township. The facts in our case are the same
as the court held in Washington and Demarest and see this article
in such and such law journal which cites the six categories that you
have to meet before you're a Mount Laurel type town or you avoid
the constitutional mandate.". ..
THE COURT: [What does the word "developing" mean?] . ..
Does twenty percent of developed land mean that that muncipality
is no longer developing in any case?-
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MR. BISGAIER: It is clear historically, clear factually, that municipalities grow and change and have an ongoing responsibility under
the Municipal Land Use Law to consider that growth and consider
demographic changes as it goes on, as time passes.THE COURT: What do you do with respect to a large municipality geographically, part of which is fully developed and part of
which is rural and part of which is "developing"? What happens in
that type of situation under the Mount Laurel doctrine?
Would the Mount Laurel principle apply at all?
MR. BISGAIER: [Yes.] The evaluation in that case would [depend
upon the results of] a reasonable housing need allocation analysis
on a regional basis ....
Having found that there is a need for
housing, the question would then be whether the municipality is
satisfying it, or whether the municipality has a defense for not
satisfying it.
THE COURT: Irrespective of whether it's developing or developed
or rural?
MR. BISGAIER: Well, I don't know how you mean . . . those

phrases unless one looks at whether growth was occurring, whether
or not growth is appropriate. If growth is occurring, the municipality is in the process of developing.
THE COURT: Aren't the labels the enemies here? There's something, it seems to me, simplistic about a rule that says that if you
are categorized as developing, you have no obligation. If you're
categorized as developed, you have one, when indeed many municipalities are, as Justice Schreiber has indicated, partially developed, partially developing, they may even be rural ..... .What
you're really, I think, .

.

. doing [is] addressing the underlying

conditions that lead to a conclusion that becomes a label. You're
saying [that] if you're developing, if you've got employees, if you're
attracting employees, you ought to provide housing for them. If
you're in a path of inevitable growth you ought to plan for housing,
even though you may be undeveloped now. I guess the question I'm
asking, I think which Justice Schreiber is asking, is: How useful are
these labels, and do they create more mischief than they're worth?
MR. BISGAIER: I don't think the court ever intended the Washington Township and Demarest cases to create the kind of labeling
that's been going on as a result. I think that the analysis that you
just articulated is the analysis the court went through in Washington Township and Demarest. If you work through that analysis in
every case rather than saying, are we developing, .

.

. are we

rural? If we went and looked-is there a resident here. . . in need
of housing and is the municipality responding to it? Are there
employees here who are in need of housing and is the municipality
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responding to it? Is there growth in this municipality? Are they
encouraging low and moderate income employees to come in?
THE COURT: Mr. Bisgaier, I take it that you would accept the
"developing" label because you hope that it would be used flexibly
to reflect the need for accommodating low and moderate income
housing, and I assume that you would also accept the notion that
the extent of the fair share of the particular municipality may
depend upon some kind of sliding scale of how developing it is or
how developing it isn't, which you would translate into how much
of the need for low and moderate income housing it should accommodate, and how much need it [should] not. Is that, generally
speaking, the reason you're willing to accept that, because you
think it's a rather expansive concept?
MR. BISGAIER: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you fear, however, that unless there is a label
somewhere, that that expansion of that concept is liable to wind up
labeling as "developing" areas that ought to be preserved as open
space, areas that ought to be preserved for farming, and that if you
tend to make it too flexible you're liable to find out that you're
making this one big state with a lot of housing spread around it in a
fashion that wouldn't satisfy any [sensible plan]?
MR. BISGAIER: No, I'm not concerned about that . . . because
• . . adequate consideration as to the viability of any particular
municipality as a rural area is one that can be done, one that's
being done. The Department of Community Affairs, in their Housing Allocation Plan, considered this. The State Development
Guide, produced by the Department of Community Affairs, considered this . . . and the Department of Commmunity Affairs then
filed a brief saying that if you use these documents . . . to evaluate
the relative appropriateness of one municipality versus another in
determining the extent of the housing obligation of that municipality as you have,THE COURT: [Suppose] there is a regional need, there is a municipality, indeed there are many in New Jersey, the urban centers in
particular, which [has] a discernible need for low and moderate
income housing, does not have the ability to meet that need, and
there are other communities which are not developing, do not have
any significant resident poor. Assume those two municipalities
were in the same region. Does the non-urban, the suburban municipality, have an obligation to provide housing to the resident poor
of the urban area?
MR. BISGAIER: I think an adequate regional analysis would answer that question. I think in some cases the answer is yes, and in
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some cases the answer is no. [When] the Department of Community Affairs did their regional analysis and the Housing Allocation
Plan, some element of that was the allocation of low and moderate
income units of persons presently in need. .

.

.But it's very difficult

to answer that question as a hypothetical. I believe that it would be
the case, as it was the case in Mount Laurel, that their obligation,
their regional obligation, extended beyond just responding to the
housing needs of the local residents, and if Mount Laurel had no
local residents, that regional obligation would have been there still.
As to the regional responsibility, our position on that is, if it can be
shown, as it appears to have been shown in the Washington Township case and Demarest, and I distinguish those cases from the
reality of the world that's out there, you had a record before youIf it can be shown that there is no regional need for housing in this
municipality, that municipality is acting appropriately by not responding to a regional need. Factually, then, I would say that that
municipality does not have [a Mount Laurel obligation]. 36
Counsel and the court had to some extent exchanged roles in the
passages just quoted. Members of the court repeatedly expressed concern about the "mischief" created by the "developing municipality"
label, and about the likelihood that it would underinclude appropriate municipalities and thus frustrate the underlying social objectives
of the Mount Laurel doctrine. Yet when pressed to agree to a point
presumably in his favor, the Public Advocate vigorously defended the
developing municipality label. Doing so required an extremely labored and unconvincing defense of the Washington Township and
Demarest cases, which he distinguished as failures of proof unrelated
to "the reality of the world that's out there.' 1 37 In substantive terms,
he proceeds to read so much flexibility into the meaning of "developing municipality" that the label could be applied to almost any municipality in the state, so long as appropriate planning criteria were
considered by the court. As so defined, it is difficult to see that the
"developing municipality" concept means anything much at all.
It is conceivable that the Public Advocate's defense of the developing municipality concept was simply a deferential bow to the principle of stare decisis, a misreading of the justices' willingness to reconsider the doctrinal problems of the concept. Juxtaposed with his
Department's lukewarm embrace of the SDGP, however, it is much
more likely that the decision to urge retention and redefinition of the
136

Tape 1(A).1.

137 See

supra text accompanying note 136 for statement of Mr. Bisgaier.
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"developing municipality" concept was essentially a political one.
Quite frankly, the court had a much better track record than the
political branches of government in supporting the interests of low
and moderate income housing advocates; retention of maximum judicial involvement and in supervision of the town-specific planning
process would better guard against the inherent risk of political compromise were the issue committed to the Department of Community
Affairs. Thus, Mr. Bisgaier's repeated response was that the answer
depended on a proper regional study as done by the court. 3
This "political" analysis (naturally not explicitly made in the oral
argument) also helps to explain how the Public Advocate could urge
presumptive effect for the HAR, the twin of the Department of Community Affairs' SDGP. As either the SDGP or the "developing municipality" doctrine could be used to define the existence of a Mount
Laurel obligation, political control of this definitional process risks
putting major segments of the state beyond the court's reach. This
risk, manifested in the Washington Township and Demarest cases,
despite their judicialized process, would be avoided in the future by a
refined application of the judicial definition, as the Public Advocate
argued.
In contrast to these effects, the HAR is essentially a remedial tool
which distributes numerical housing goals to those municipalities independently found to have a Mount Laurel obligation. Thus, it would
come into play only after Mount Laurel jurisdiction was perfected,
and the court would therefore retain a greater ability to correct errors
in the political process as they appeared. Additionally, to the extent
that the HAR methodology "incorporates" the SDGP, the court's
independent determination of where Mount Laurel obligations lie
would justify its departure from the HAR in this regard.
As noted, Mount Laurel II does not follow the urging of the
Public Advocate with respect to either the SDGP or the HAR. To
evaluate the court's solution, a look at an additional segment of the
argument will be useful.
C. The Three Mount Laurel Judges
Vesting trial jurisdiction over Mount Laurel cases exclusively in
three judges, each solely responsible for one group of counties,1 39 is

138

Id.

For a listing of the three Mount Laurel judges and the respective counties to which they
have been assigned see 111 N.J.L.J. 637 (June 16, 1983).
139
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one of the most singular aspects of the Mount Laurel II opinion, yet it
is not mentioned in the twenty-four questions and is barely hinted at
in the oral argument. In the middle of the second day of argument,
during consideration of a number of technical problems involved in
the review and revision of unconstitutional municipal ordinances, the
following exchange took place between the court and Bertram Busch,
attorney for the Township of East Brunswick:
THE COURT: Counsel, may I ask you this-it's in reference to
something you said. Do you think there would be any advantage to
the court to establishing a special panel of judges rather than have
appeals go to the general appellate division where we have seven or
so separate panels-to have a special panel just to hear zoning
cases. You mentioned something in that area and I just wanted to
see if that was what you were suggesting or something you think-

MR. BUSCH: I think it would make sense, the way in the federal
courts one judge has the case at the trial level from the beginning. I
think it would make sense so you would not have conflicting
. . results, although, as I've been reading the appellate division
cases, they have interpreted [Madison Township] and Mount Laurel fairly consistently and somewhat differently from some of the
trial judges and differently from the way plaintiffs and their allies
would like to see them go. But, sure, I think that a special panel
might make sense.
THE COURT: How about at the trial level?
MR. BUSCH: Well, I think in effect what you do have-or have
had, and I think there was even forum shopping in some cases-I
think that some judges are simply equipped to handle it and some
are not. I don't know that the supreme court could order each
county to have one zoning judgeTHE COURT: You like the idea of specialists?
MR. BUSCH: Well, I think it would result in some kind of intelli140
gent and consistent findings in this situation ....
The apparently spontaneous suggestion just quoted appears to be
the only consideration during the arguments of one of the central
features of the resulting decision, one which goes a long way toward

reconciling the concerns expressed by the Public Advocate with the
approach selected by the court.

140 Tape 6(B).3.
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D. Evaluating the Mount Laurel Methodology
Although couched in the language of law, Mount Laurel II reveals a supremely political instinct on the part of the court. Despite
the Public Advocate's preference for and faith in the judicial system,
an understandable attitude given the zoning history that led to Mount
Laurel I, the court's solution discloses a more sophisticated appreciation of the process problems involved in exclusionary zoning cases.
Use of the SDGP encourages voluntary compliance with the
Mount Laurel doctrine because it achieves maximum clarity on the
most critical question in Mount Laurel litigation-whether the municipality is subject to liability. This clarity could not be achieved by
court-made doctrine of the sort urged by the Public Advocate. It
remains true that many other aspects of Mount Laurel methodology
remain imprecise, such as how to calculate a specific fair share number. Most noncomplying ordinances, however, are sufficiently noncomplying that advance knowledge of such sources of imprecision is
unlikely to encourage recalcitrant municipalities to hold out, but
rather will induce settlement on terms that avoid trial of the methodological issues altogether.
Moreover, use of the SDGP contains internal political checks less
characteristic of the HAR. By attributing the Mount Laurel obligation
to the growth areas mapped by the SDGP, the court clearly has
relieved a number of communities of the obligation, and these communities can be expected to have some self-interest in protecting the
SDGP against legislative hostility. In addition, the "developing municipality" approach is available to the court as a backup technique
should the SDGP fail for any reason.' 4 ' As the Public Advocate's
argument demonstrates, a very loose interpretation of the "developing
municipality" doctrine is possible, one which has virtually no predictive certainty, and the threat of return to this unsatisfactory system
surely increases the attractiveness of the SDGP.
Compared to the SDGP, the HAR was a less suitable document
in terms of political and judicial process. It distributed housing goals
much more widely than the SDGP distributed growth areas, 42 and
thus increased the likelihood of a political coalition against its use.
Indeed, that coalition succeeded even before Mount Laurel II was
43
announced, with Governor Kean's rescission of the executive orders
41 See
142

supra note 135.

See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 244 n.17, 456 A.2d at 433-34 n.17 (noting that the HAR

would have imposed the Mount Laurel obligation upon limited growth areas as well as growth
areas).
141 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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upon which the HAR was based. While the HAR remained physically
available to the court, it was so deprived of political legitimacy at that
point that its use would have put the court further out on a limb,
rather than helping to "co-opt" the political branches, as use of the
SDGP had done. Moreover, in the absence of the HAR, there was no
fallback technique available to the court comparable to the revival of
the "developing municipality" doctrine.
By concentrating the Mount Laurel caseload in a small number
of trial judges, the court, in a way none of the parties had anticipated
or requested, cleverly provided a mechanism for assuring methodological expertise. It allowed a numerical solution to the remedy problem,
which was the prime attraction of the HAR, and, as a function of the
three judges becoming more informed on the methodological issues, it
guaranteed a fairly high degree of certainty and consistency without
interminable delays. It also relieved the remainder of the trial system
of a class of cases that had been extremely unpopular with the judges
assigned to them. Moreover, by offering the prospect of judgments not
unlike those that would have been achieved under the HAR, the court
implicitly has invited the political branches to rethink their policy of
noninvolvement. Should a revived or revised HAR be issued, it could
still be given substantial weight in the decisionmaking by the three
judges.
The weakest aspect of the Mount Laurel II opinion is the defense
of the legitimacy of the SDGP. As the above comments suggest, use of
the SDGP had important political advantages compared to the HAR,
yet the provenance of the two documents was remarkably similar.
The oral arguments, in turn, had displayed the court's sensitivity to
the legitimacy question, illustrated by the intensive questioning of the
Public Advocate on this score.
Against the backdrop of these concerns, the opinion is unconvincing in distinguishing the two plans. The court notes that the SDGP
derives from legislative authority and that the legislature was aware of
it in published form and had mandated reference to it in master plans
prepared pursuant to the MLUL.1 44 Conformity to the plan is not
binding on municipalities; however, the best the court can do to
demonstrate the authoritative nature of the plan is to note the wide
45
consultative process that preceded its publication in final draft form
and to assert that the legislature acted "[p]resumably with knowledge
of the Division's [of State and Regional Planning] ongoing work in
' 46
preparing the SDGP.'
"I
'45
146

See Mt. Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 225-32, 456 A.2d at 423-27.
Id. at 225 n.9, 456 A.2d at 424 n.9.
Id. at 228, 456 A.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
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This is slender stuff indeed, and perhaps the court should have
acknowledged more frankly the limited commitment of the political
branches to the planning concepts embodied in the SDGP. The sleight
of hand actually engaged in is hardly unknown to the common law
process, however, and the point here is not to criticize the approach
taken. Rather, the point is to recognize the full scope of the political
daring to which the supreme court has committed itself.
One of the twenty-four questions propounded by the court raised
the possibility of imposing regional planning responsibilities on the
state as a more effective way of achieving Mount Laurel objectives. 141
The suggestion merited exactly one sentence in the three days of oral
argument, a builder-plaintiff noting that such a drastic remedy was
not necessary. 48 Essentially, however, that is what Mount Laurel II
achieves, not because the court ordered it and not because the legislature wanted it, but because the court did not hesitate to manufacture
a legislative policy choice where none existed in fact. Moreover, as the
prior discussion has suggested, the context of the SDGP makes it fairly
likely that the court's result will not be significantly overturned.
This judicial gambit can be discerned from the opinion alone, but
the content of the oral argument throws it into high relief. Even in the
face of realistic doubts about the political consensus behind documents
such as the HAR or the SDGP, the court is prepared to breathe life
into them in order to draw the legislature and the executive into the
process of solving the low and moderate income housing problem.
That it did not do so with respect to the HAR says more about the
utility of the HAR itself than it does about the court's concern for
"true" political legitimacy.
This inquiry into the methodology of Mount Laurel II suggests
the end of the court's naive expectation that a political response will
be volunteered, and a determination to stimulate such response however possible. 49 This is not to say that the court relies solely on such
quasi-legislative solutions in Mount Laurel II. The use of the three

See Appendix A, infra, Question (3)[b].
Tape 4(B).9. (Philip Lindeman, Esq.); cf. Appendix A, inJra, Question (3)[b].
"I That Mount Laurel II opinion proceeds consciously on this theory is reinforced by the
supreme court's only post-Mount Laurel II opinion to date. In In re Egg Harbor Assocs.
(Bayshore Centre), 94 N.J. 358, 464 A.2d 1115 (1983), the court held that a state statute
regulating development in environmentally sensitive coastal zones supported imposition of a
20% Mount Laurel set-aside on a new housing development given a permit in the zone. The
court's effort to construe the requirement out of the statute, which was adopted prior to Mount
Laurel II, is unconvincing but again has the effect of building a legislative foundation for the
court's decision. See Payne, Doctrine and Politics in Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 12 REAL
EST. L.J. 359, 363 (1984).
147
141
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Mount Laurel judges and the virtually unlimited discretion given to
them is an aggressive, even outrageous remedy in conventional legal
process terms, and would surely not survive judicial review were it a
legislative-administrative delegation rather than internal to the judiciary. Even as such, however, this strong judicial remedy implicitly
respects the legislative role because, as noted above, the likelihood of
effective judicial determination of a regional fair share methodology
also increases the likelihood that the political branches will decide of
themselves to recapture the initiative, leaving the court to the lesser
(and more conventional) role of reviewing for outer limits of acceptability.
After Mount Laurel II, in short, legislative and political inaction
has become much more costly (to legislators and executives hostile to
the Mount Laurel doctrine) than before. This is the heart of the court's
initiative in Mount Laurel II and, if it succeeds, it will chart the way
for a new judicial role in stimulating legislative responses to a whole
series of complex social problems that might otherwise go unresolved.
For those with both a social conscience and a respect for the limits of
adjudication in a democratic society, this is a most pleasing possibility.
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Dear Counsel: *
In the interests of clarity and efficiency, the Supreme Court has
decided to structure oral argument in the six zoning cases listed for
May 19 and 20, 1980 around the attached questions. These questions
touch upon the critical issues raised by you in each of the cases to be
argued and are drawn from information contained in the briefs and
appendices submitted by the parties. They do not reflect an attempt to
exhaust all issues raised by the facts before the Court, but rather are
intended to focus on those areas of exclusionary zoning law that
appear, from the record, to warrant a concentration of appellate
review and guidance. Obviously, no conclusions about the Court's
position on any of these issues should be drawn from the sequence or
wording.
Although the Court believes that a carefully organized oral argument in these cases is essential, it considers the necessity to have all
important questions before it for resolution to be of equal value. If,
after a careful examination of the attached questions, you feel that a
critical issue in your case has not been addressed or that you have an
objection to a question as stated, please notify me within 7 days of the
receipt of this letter.
Oral arguments will be apportioned to avoid repetition. To that
end, all counsel eligible to argue will meet in Trenton with me on
Monday, May 12, 1980 at 10:00 a.m. in the Supreme Court courtroom to resolve the argument sequence and the apportionment of
issues to be discussed. Counsel for plaintiffs and related amici curiae
shall consult, through Marilyn Morheuser, Esq., among themselves
prior to that meeting in order to determine whether they can agree to
a division of argument time. Counsel for defendants and related amici
curiae shall consult through Thomas Farino, Jr., Esq., for the same
purpose.
If you have any questions with regard to the above, you may
contact me at 609/292-4837.
Very truly yours,
Stephen W. Townsend
Clerk
* (See attached lists).
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QUESTIONS
(1) Discuss the application of the duty not to exclude, as first
announced in Mt. Laurel, to all types of housing (i.e., regardless of
income level).
(2) Discuss the appropriate procedural posture for the joinder of
necessary/desirable parties in an exclusionary zoning suit (for example, neighboring municipalities in a particular county of region).
(3) Discuss the relevance of the Municipal Land Use Law
(MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1, et seq. (in particular, the general welfare requirement in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-2(a)) in exclusionary zoning
cases.
[a] Does the MLUL adopt the dictates of Mt. Laurel and require
compliance by all municipalities?
[b] If the MLUL "general welfare" duty is interpreted so that the
regional need requirements of Mt. Laurel are limited to developing
municipalities, is delegation of the zoning power to other municipalities without a concommitant [sic] regional perspective require-

ment unconstitutional? See Payne, 29 Rutgers L. Rev. 803 (1976).
[c] If the MLUL represents a complete adoption of Mt. Laurel [sic]
principles, should the Court adjust its focus in these cases so as to
concentrate on violations of the statute?
[d] Discuss those legislative enactments listed in the amicus curiae
brief of legislators accepted by Court on April 16, 1980 that are
responsive to the exclusionary zoning problem.
(4) Discuss the significance of Executive Order 35. Discuss any
other similar initiatives relating to the problems of exclusionary zoning that you may be aware of.
(5) What practical effects have the decisions in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, Oakwood at Madison v.
Madison, Pascack v. Mayor and Council of Township of Washington
and Fobe v. Demarest had on either zoning or housing in New Jersey?
(6) Is the underlying goal of Mt. Laurel-providing housing
opportunities outside urban areas for low and moderate income New
Jersey citizens-economically feasible? Will attainment of the goal
affect another important goal of this state-to rehabilitate its cities?
(7) Discuss the wisdom of limiting the reach of Mt. Laurel to
developing municipalities.
[a] What rationale exists to support such distinction?
[b] Would the distinction reward those municipalities who have
used exclusionary zoning most successfully, either in remaining
rural, or becoming developed without providing a variety of types
of housing opportunities?
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[c] What impact would the distinction have on the Executive's
apparent priority to help rebuild urban areas? (See 1980 State of
the State message.) Would it add to or subtract from an effort to
concentrate on urban problems?
[d] Discuss the function of the six Mt. Laurel criteria relating to the
"developing" status of a municipality.
[e] Are the criteria (a) conjunctive? (b) merely illustrative?
[f] Can a municipality fit into more than one Mt. Laurel category
(undeveloped, developing, developed) simultaneously? For example, what is the "duty" of an 80% developed municipality under
Mt. Laurel ?
(8) Discuss the relevance of "fiscal zoning" to Mt. Laurel cases.
Should the Mt. Laurel doctrine be dependent on a showing of fiscally
exclusionary motive or purpose or is the effect of exclusion the only
factor to be considered in exclusionary zoning litigation?
(9) Discuss the wisdom of a per se rule against large lot (e.g., 5
acre) zoning.
(10) When, under Mt. Laurel, does the presumption of invalidity of an ordinance (based on particular exclusionary characteristics)
attach and to what extent? What evidence will rebut such presumption?
(11) Discuss the proper function of the Housing Allocation Plan
of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs Division of State
and Regional Planning (Division on Planning) in exclusionary zoning
litigation.
[a] Should a demonstration of satisfaction of a particular Division
on Planning allocation constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with Mt. Laurel?
[b] Should fair share orders imposed on non-complying municipalities adopt the Division on Planning's allocation unless the municipality demonstrates that such allocation is inappropriate.
[c] What effect should changed allocation have on a finding of
previous compliance?
(12) Discuss the proper function of the State Development Guide
Plan in such litigation.
(13) Can and should a fair share/regional need allocation be used
to:
[a] meet today's housing needs throughout the State;
[b] remedy prior exclusions by particular municipalites [sic];
[c] meet future demands for housing in New Jersey:
[i] from within the State
[ii] throughout the Northeast Corridor?
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(14) Discuss the relevance of an existing county-wide percentage
of low and moderate income housing in an analysis of a particular
municipality's compliance or non-compliance with Mt. Laurel.
-Is the concept of "tipping" relevant in this area?
(15) Discuss the fair share formula introduced in Mt. Laurel at 67
N.J. 190, and cited by Justice Pashman in Pascack at 74 N.J. 511.
[a] Should municipalities have an absolute duty to provide an
opportunity for housing for all present and potential employees in
the region?
[b] Should a change in employment figures affect such litigation?
(16) Discuss the function of the "time of decision" rule (which,
when applicable, requires judicial review of a law or ordinance to
focus on the version of the law in effect at the time the judicial
decision is made).
[a] Is the rule applicable?
[b] If so, should a time limitation on the right to submit amendments to a zoning ordinance be placed on defendant municipalities
to avoid dilatory action?
[c] How can time-consuming remands triggered by submission of
amended ordinances by avoided?
[d] How can the problems stemming from outdated statistics be
avoided?
[e] How does the rule affect the shifting burden of proof in exclusionary zoning cases once a prima facie showing of exclusion is
made-does submission of an amended ordinance during trial return the burden of proving invalidity to plaintiffs? on appeal? after
final appellate review when compliance with a final judgment is
questioned?
[f] When, if ever, should a trial court ignore amendments submitted during litigation and look only at the original ordinance?
(17) Should a trial court retain jurisdiction to rule on orders of
compliance after the main case has been appealed?
(18) What function should a showing of good faith or bona fide
efforts at compliance with existing principles of law play in these
cases?
(19) Discuss the validity of a "trickling down" theory in the
current housing market.
(20) Discuss the function of "phasing" in a fair share plan.
(21) Discuss the legal and practical implications of the following
remedial devices a court might employ in exclusionary zoning cases.
[a] Total invalidation of an ordinance, accompanied by an order to

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
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draft a new ordinance within a certain time period (i.e., 90 days)
or be unzoned, see Orgo Farms.
[b] Presumptive variances as suggested by Justice Pashman in Pascack and Fobe.
[c] An order for specific rezoning of plaintiffs' land for multi-family
development (Builder's remedy).
[d] Orders to seek subsidies, provide density bonuses, institute rentskewing.
[e] Specific rezoning for high-density development accompanied by
automatic reverter if the development planned is not for low and
moderate income units.
(22) Should all remedies developed in these cases be tracked to
the level of need in the region and/or municipality, or does Oakwood
[sic] suggest the possibility of "numberless" (as opposed to fair share/
regional need) remedies?
(23) Discuss the function of expert planners in exclusionary zoning litigation:
[a] At what stage of such litigation should expert planners be
utilized?
[b] Should a trial judge delegate rezoning authority to such expert,
and embody the product of such rezoning in the trial court judgment?
[c] How should such expert be selected and paid?
(24) Should the trial judge assume a supervisory role over the
implementation of his order? If so, how long should such role continue?
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